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One year after its much criticized' decision in General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert,2 the Supreme Court rendered an opinion in Nashville
Gas Co. v. Satty3 which may give renewed life to the prohibition of
sex discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 Like
Gilbert, Satty involved the question of whether disparate treatment
because of pregnancy constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII.
A negative response by the Gilbert court had opened a possibility that
all employment practices with regard to pregnancy were beyond re-
dress. But in Satty, the court found one such practice discriminatory
and thereby narrowed considerably the breadth of the Gilbert holding.
In Gilbert, the Court held 'that the exclusion of pregnancy from
coverage under a disability benefits program does not amount to sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII. Relying on Ged'dldig v.
Aiello,5 a case that arose not under Title VII but under the equal
protection clause of the Constitution, and which 'held 'that pregnancy
classifications are not gender-based per se,6 the Court argued -that preg-
nancy discrimination is not within the meaning of "sex discrimina-
tion" in Title VII. Therefore, a violation could be shown only by
1. See, e.g., Ginsburg & Ross, Pregnancy and Discrimination, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25,
1977, at 35, col. 2; Note, Denying Maternity Benefits Is Not Sex Discrimination Under
Title VII, 28 MERCER L. lzv. 977 (1977).
2. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
3. 98 S.Ct. 347 (1977).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). Section 2000e-2,
entitled "Unlawful employment practices," reads:
(a) Employer practices. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Id. at 2000e-2(a) (1), (2).
5. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
6. Id. at 496-97 n.20, cited in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 134-35.
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proving the existence of a pretext to discriminate.1 Since the Court
found no such pretext in Gilbert,8 it appeared doubtful that any clas-
sification by pregnancy could be shown to be unlawful under Title
VII.
Satty presented the Court with two allegedly discriminatory em-
ployment practices. The Nashville Gas Company required all preg-
nant employees to take a leave of absence without the benefit of ac-
crued sick pay, a benefit to which all other disabled employees were
entitled. Moreover, upon return to work, an employee who had been
compelled to -take such a leave of absence suffered a loss of all accumu-
lated seniority for job-bidding purposes. Relying on Gilbert in its
analysis of the sick-pay program, the Court in Satty found no discrimi-
nation on the theories presented, but remanded the case for a determi-
nation of whether ,Nora Satty could proceed on the theory of pretext."
The Court did find, however, that the policy of denying senority was
unlawful under the theory of disproportionate impact upon women.10
This 'holding thus reopened the possibility that where the facts of a
case differ from those in Gilbert, classifications based on pregnancy
may be found to constitute unlawful sex discrimination.
This comment will examine the issues presented iii Nashville Gas
Co. v. Satty and the Supreme Court's treatment of those issues. Since
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert is central to Satty's analysis, it will be
necessary to examine the decision rendered in Gilbert, as well as its
application to the issues in Satty. In so doing, this Comment will
show how the Satty opinion limits the scope of Gilbert. An analysis
of the implications of 'the Satty decision will then be presented, with
an emphasis on its potential impact on future cases involving preg-
nancy classifications.
I. GENERAL ELEcTRc Co. v. GILBERT
Gilbert involved a company disability plan which paid benefits
to employees unable to work because of medical reasons. The only
disabilities excluded from the plan's coverage were those that occurred
during pregnancy; pregnant employees lost all benefits under the pro-
7. The Court left open the possibility that a violation may be found where dis-
criminatory effect is shown, but did not reach this issue since the respondents made no
such showing. 429 U.S. at 136-38.
8. Id. at 136.
9. 98 S.Ct. at 353.
10. Id. at 351.
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gram, including coverage for disabilities unrelated to their pregnan-
cies.'1 The district court,'2 adopting the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission's guidelines for sex discrimination under Title
VII,13 held that this exclusion violated Title VII's prohibition against
sex discrimination.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
lower court.' 4 The Supreme Court, however, found the EEOC guide-
lines inconsistent with earlier EEOC pronouncements and remote from
the time of the enactment of Title VII.15 It concluded that these ad-
ministrative interpretations thus failed to meet the standards of per-
suasiveness set out in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,"6 and declined to fol-
low them. Since there is no definition of sex discrimination in the
Civil Rights Act itself, the Court was then free to determine the mean-
ing through prior judicial interpretations.
The Court turned to its 1974 decision in Geduldig v. Aiello,17
where in a footnote it had stated that a pregnancy classification is not
gender based per se. Accordingly, a policy to treat pregnancy differ-
ently from other conditions could not be considered prima facie dis-
criminatory; such a policy would be facially neutral unless it had been
created as a pretext to discriminate. Since Geduldig had involved a
challenge to a California disability program which excluded pregnancy
from its coverage, the Court found it to be "precisely in point" and
dispositive of the issue in Gilbert.' But while the facts of the two cases
may have been similar, the legal issues were not. Geduldig was argued
on the grounds of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment' which, in absence of a pretext to discriminate, requires only a
minimally rational basis for a classification based on sex.2 0 Thus, rely-
11. One female employee on maternity leave was denied disability benefits for hos-
pitalization for a pulmonary embolism which was totally unrelated to her pregnancy.
429 U.S. at 129 n.4.
12. 375 F.Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970). See text accompanying note 111 infra.
14. 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1976).
15. 429 U.S. at 142-45.
16. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). In reference to interpretations of the administrative
agency, the Court in Skidmore said: "The weight of such a judgment in a particular
case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Id. at 140. For a dis-
cussion of this point, see text accompanying notes 113-14 infra.
17. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
18. 429 U.S. at 136.
19. 417 U.S. at 484.
20. Although the Supreme Court decisions in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971),
and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), led many to believe that gender
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ing directly on Geduldig, the Gilbert Court applied the constitutional
standard to a case brought on statutory grounds.
This application was clearly incorrect in light of the Court's de-
cision only months earlier in Washington v. Davis.-2 There, the Su-
preme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia which had applied Title VII standards in the resolution of a con-
stitutional issue. Davis held that a statutory analysis required the ap-
plication of a "more rigorous' 22 standard. A successful constitutional
attack requires a finding of discriminatory purpose where the policy
in question is facially neutral. In contrast, a Title VII violation may
be found where there is no intent to discriminate, as long as a dis-
criminatory impact is demonstrated. Therefore, absent a bona fide
job-related purpose, a policy that has the effect of discriminating will
be proscribed by Title VII.
This statutory analysis has been consistently applied since the
Court's 1970 decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.23 Griggs held that
the absence of discriminatory intent did not legalize an employment
practice under Title VII if its effect was discriminatory: "Congress
directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment prac-
tices, not simply the motivation." 24 When the Court in Gilbert ap-
plied the Geduldig holding that a pregnancy classification is facially
neutral, it appeared to imply that discriminatory intent would be re-
quired. Thus, the Gilbert Court defined sex discrimination using a
standard recognized as inappropriate in both Griggs and Davis.
Before Gilbert, courts deciding cases of alleged sex discrimination
under Title VII had refused to rely on Geduldig. Although urged to
apply the reasoning in Geduldig,25 these courts felt constrained 'to limit
the precedential value of the case to constitutional issues.26 For exam-
would invoke a more rigorous standard of scrutiny, the Court has refused to include
sex as a suspect classification, see, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), and
thus has applied a rationality test to such cases. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Gil-
bert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
21. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
22. Id. at 247.
23. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). This case represents the Supreme Court's initial at-
tempt at defining the scope of review under Title VII.
24. Id. at 432.
25. When confronted with the issue of whether a distinction between pregnancy-
related disabilities and other disabilities is sex-based, it has been argued that the deci-
sion in Geduldig, that it is not sex-based (absent a showing of a pretext to discrimi-
nate), should control.
26. See, e.g., Communication Workers of America v. American Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1033
(1977); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on
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ple, in 1975 the Sixth Circuit in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty27 recog-
nized the possibility of using the Geduldig footnote instead of the
necessary statutory analysis under the Civil Rights Act but rejected this
as a harsh result2 8 In December of the following year, however, the
Supreme Court in Gilbert effected precisely the result the Sixth Cir-
cuit had tried to avoid. It substituted the admittedly different and
narrower definition adopted under constitutional analysis for the statu-
tory interpretation of "discrimination because of sex" under Title VII.
Thus, when the Satty case reached the Supreme Court, the Nashville
Gas Company argued that Gilbert required the reversal of the Sixth
Circuit opinion. As the Company reasoned in its brief: "[I]t rationally
follows from [the finding in Gilbert] that any personnel policy which
excludes pregnancy from coverage but in all other aspects treats women
and men equal is not in itself discrimination based on sex."29
II. NASHvILLE GAs Co. v. SAry
Nora Satty was employed as an accounting clerk by the Nashville
Gas Company. On December 29, 1972, following a period of absences
due to pregnancy-related illness, she was placed on maternity leave at
the request of the company's Vice President of Personnel. Because of
a company policy that allowed pregnant employees to apply accumu-
lated vacation time but not sick leave days to their maternity leave,
Satty received none of the sick pay she had accrued over -three and one-
half years of employment. 30
During her mandated maternity leave, Satty's position was elimi-
nated as a result of a changeover to computer processing. When she
returned from leave on March 14, 1973, she was assigned to a tempo-
rary position which she held until April 14, 1973. During this period,
she applied for the three permanent positions that became available,
but since the gas company's policy was to refuse to recognize for job-
bidding purposes any seniority accumulated by an employee before a
leave of absence, Satty was turned down each time in favor of an em-
ployee who had been hired after she first joined the company.31
jurisdictional grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976). Contra, Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego
School District, 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1033
(1977).
27. 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975).
28. Id. at 853.
29. Brief for Petitioner at 14, Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 98 S.Ct. 347 (1977).
30. 98 S.Ct. at 352-53.
31. Id. at 350.
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On May 10, 1973, Satty requested that her employment be termi-
nated to enable her to apply for unemployment compensation. She
subsequently filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission and, after exhausting her administrative rem-
edies,32 initiated an action against the Nashville Gas Company for
alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.3 On November 4, 1974, the district court found the Nash-
ville Gas Company in violation of Title VII for its policies of denying
sick leave pay to persons on maternity leave and eliminating their
seniority for job-bidding purposes. 34 It granted Satty recovery of sick
leave benefits and back wages as well as reinstatement as a permanent
employee with full seniority. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the decision and reasoning of the lower court, and found the
relief granted appropriate.35
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the issue of sick pay
denial was controlled by its decision in Gilbert that a company policy
denying benefits during pregnancy is not discriminatory on its face. 0
It found the Nashville Gas Company's policy "indistinguishable" from
General Electric's disability plan, and therefore violative of Title VII
only if the exclusion of pregnancy was a pretext for a discriminatory
purpose.37 The decision of the court of appeals on this issue was there-
fore vacated and the case remanded to consider two issues: (1) whether
Satty had raised the claim of pretext so that this theory may be con-
sidered on appeal; and (2) whether such a pretext did exist.38
On the issue of seniority, however, Gilbert was not dispositive.
The Court's analysis followed Gilbert only in finding that "[p]eti-
32. Satty received the required "right to sue" letter from the E.E.O.C. on April
5, 1974. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 98 S. Ct. 347 (1977).
33. Satty originally sought to maintain the suit as a class action, but subsequently
stipulated that the number of persons she could represent would not be sufficiently nu-
merous. Id.
34. 384 F.Supp. 765 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd, 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 98 S.Ct. 347 (1977). The district court based its findings
on an analysis of the standard applicable after the Supreme Court decision in Geduldig.
The court held Geduldig not controlling. Id. at 771.
35. 522 F.2d 850 (6th Oh'. 1975). In reaffirming the conclusion of the district
court that the scope of Title VII extends beyond the reach of the equal protection
clause, the court of appeals concluded: "Otherwise, Title VII's effective reach would
be limited by the decisions of the Supreme Court, a result effectively curtailing imple-
mentation." Id. at 855.
36. The majority opinion was delivered by Justice Rehnquist who was joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White and Blackmun. Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall and Powell joined in Part I of the opinion. 98 S.Ct. at 347-54.
37. Id. at 352.
38. Id. at 353.
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tioner's decision not to treat pregnancy as a disease or disability for
purposes of seniority retention is not on its face a discriminatory pol-
icy." 39 The Court then applied the Griggs standard to hold that since
the effect of the Company's policy was discriminatory, it violated Title
VII.4° Explaining its holding, the Court stated: "It is beyond dispute
that petitioner's policy of depriving employees returning from preg-
nancy leave of their accumulated seniority acts both to deprive them
'of employment opportunities' and to 'adversely affect [their] status as
employee[s].'"41
The majority attempted -to distinguish Gilbert from Satty by char-
acterizing the cases as a matter of benefits versus burdens. In Gilbert,
the disability program provided monetarily equal benefits for men and
women. The inclusion of pregnancy as a compensable disability would
have provided an additional benefit for women. The Satty Court ex-
plained that Gilbert refused to extend greater benefits to pregnant
women merely because of their different role "in the scheme of exist-
ence." 42 As a result of the Nashville Gas Company's policies regarding
seniority, however, Satty was being burdened because of her gender
by being deprived of employment opportunities after pregnancy
leave.43 This burden constitutes a violation of Title VII so long as
there is no justifiable business necessity for its imposition. In Satty,
the Supreme Court agreed that since no proof of business necessity was
offered, the conclusion of the district court that no justification exists
was correct.4
In holding that the senority policy's disproportionate impact upon
women constituted unlawful sex discrimination, the Satty Court lim-
ited the application of Geduldig to situations which are factually simi-
lar to Gilbert. If Geduldig had been applied to the seniority issue, the
company policy would have fallen only if intentional discrimination
had been proven.4 5 Satty adopted this analysis only in dealing with
39. Id. at 350. The company policy allowed the employee, male or female, to con-
tinue to accrue seniority while on leave for any illness or disability other than preg-
nancy. Id.
40. Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion in Gilbert, expressed his disagree-
ment with the majority's possible inference that the effect may never be a controlling
factor in a Title VII case. 429 U.S. at 146. This evidenced the concern-which was
soon shared by others-that Gilbert would require all Title VII cases to be viewed
under the standards applied in Geduldig.
41. 98 S.Ot. at 350-5 1.
42. 429 U.S. at 139 n.17, cited in 98 S.Ct. at 351.
43. 98 S.Ot. at 351.
44. Id. at 352.
45. See text accompanying notes 14-20 supra.
1978]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the gas company's sick-pay plan which it viewed as "legally indis-
tinguishable" from General Electric's disability plan. 40
But a disability plan that provides women with a set of benefits
that is actuarially equivalent to the set of benefits provided to men,
even though it may deny pregnant women certain benefits, is analyti-
cally distinguishable from an employment policy that places a burden
upon women alone-that is, without placing an actuarially equivalent
burden on men. Had Satty not made such a distinction, employers
would have had enormous latitude in determining most conditions of
employment for pregnant women 47 making constitutiona 4 and Title
VII violations virtually impossible to prove.
Thus while Gilbert's interpretation of sex discrimination remains
questionable, it appears that even after Gilbert, a pregnancy policy
that shows a disparate effect upon women with regard to their employ-
ment opportunities or status as employees will not stand. Satty makes
it clear -that although pregnancy policies may be facially neutral with
respect to gender, they may have the effect of discriminating against
women and thus violate Title VII. It is possible, however, that a dis-
criminatory effect will be found only in disparate treatment within
the context of employment and not of leave, 4 owing to the long-term
effect upon a worker of an employment practice such as the loss of
seniority in Satty. In comparison with the denial of sick-leave pay, the
seniority policy had a greater impact on Nora Satty in her role as an
employee;50 because of the denial of seniority, Satty's potential for eco-
nomic and career advancement suffered permanent harm.
46. 98 S.Ct. at 352.
47. Wendy W. Williams, Asst. Prof. of Law at Georgetown Univ. Law Center and
attorney for plaintiffs in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), believes that had the
Satty decision been favorable to the employers on all issues, "[c]ommon employer prac-
tices such as termination of pregnant employees, refusal to hire or promote because of
pregnancy, loss of retirement benefits and benefit seniority, and loss of credit toward ten-
ure for teachers would probably then be placed beyond redress under Title VII." Wil-
liams, Nashville Gas Company v. Nora D. Satty, PREvIEw OF UNITED STATES SUPREME
CouRT CASES No. 6 at 1, 3 (Oct. 10, 1977).
48. Since Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), held that discrimination based
on denial of disability payments for pregnancy is not gender-based, it may be that the
Court viewed gender-based classifications as only those which provide different treat-
ment for men and women with respect to shared traits or capacities. Hence, pregnancy
discrimination is not sex discrimination and no violation of equal protection doctrines
can result from exclusion of pregnancy benefits. However, Turner v. Dep't of Employ-
ment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975) suggests that due process arguments regarding con-
clusive presumptions of incapacity in the matter of maternity leaves are still valuable
tools for protecting against extended forced leaves. See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
49. See 98 S.Ct. at 357-59 (Stevens, J., concurring), for Justice Stevens' analysis
of when the varying standards apply.
50. Williams, supra note 47.
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Finally, Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Satty suggests
that the two statutory subdivisions of Section 703 of Title VII may
require different standards of proof. Griggs held that a violation of
Section 703(a)(2) may be proven by a showing of discriminatory
effect; Satty, however, implied that it may be necessary to prove intent
under Section 703(a) (1).51 That Gilbert was brought under Section
703 (a) (1) may serve to explain the majority's reliance upon Geduldig
in -that case. The Court did not resolve this question in Satty, but it
did limit its treatment of the effect to the issues of Section 703 (a)
(2): impact upon the employee within the scope of his employment.
The mere loss of income while on leave falls within the Gilbert sit-
uation and, absent a discriminatory effect, is violative only where the
preclusion is a pretext for sex discrimination. The majority pointed
to Satty's admission that the decision in Gilbert would control on the
question of sick leave 52 as evidence that Satty had not fulfilled her
burden of showing effect.5 3 However, Satty had contended-perhaps
in light of Gilbert and the possibility that an impact upon employees
while on leave might not be considered a discriminatory effect-that
the entire treatment of pregnant employees evidenced a policy of sex
discrimination by the Nashville Gas Company. It is this question
which will be considered on remand if it appears from the record that
the issue was properly reserved.
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, attempted to reconcile
the two parts of the Satty decision by viewing the denial of sick leave
pay as discrimination among disabilities; the denial of seniority would
constitute discrimination among employees. While the Gilbert Court
found the former neutral, it would consider the latter discrimina-
tory. Stevens concluded that where the employment practice in ques-
tion adversely affects women workers after the pregnancy leave is ter-
minated, it constitutes discrimination against a class of employees
rather than discrimination among physical conditions.54 Hence, where
treatment is different only during pregnancy, the Court would find no
discrimination because of sex.
51. 98 S.Ct. at 352-53.
52. Brief for Respondent at 8, 12, Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 98 S.Ct. 347 (1977).
See also Arguments Before the Court, Sex Discrimination, 46 U.S.L.W. 3231, 3232
(Oct. 11, 1977).
53. "When confronted by a facially neutral plan, whose only fault is underinclu-
siveness, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the plan discriminates on the basis
of sex in violation of Title VII. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)." 98 S.Ct. at
352.
54. 98 S.Ct. at 357-59.
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Justice Powell, concurring in part,55 would have allowed the par-
ties on remand to present evidence of the actuarially determined value
of -the sick-pay program to both men and women, since a finding that
these values were indeed unequal would establish prima facie discrimi-
nation. He argued that such evidence was unnecessary before Gilbert
and that it would therefore be unfair not to allow Satty the oppor-
tunity to present it. Powell felt that Satty should be broadened on re-
mand to include theories consistent with the Gilbert opinion. The
majority, however, disagreed. Characterizing the reasoning in Gilbert
as merely one possible way to analyze a Title VII case after Geduldig,"0
it argued that Satty's failure to anticipate such reasoning is not ex-
cusable. 57
III. IMPLICATIONS AND IMPACT
The Satty case should have a strong impact on future sex dis-
crimination cases brought under Title VII. In addition to distinguish-
ing pregnancy discrimination claims arising under section 703 (a) (2)
of Title VII,5s from Gilbert, which was brought under section 703 (a)
(1), Satty may give rise to several broader changes. For purposes of
analysis, this section will focus on five areas most likely to be affected:
(1) the Court's approach to sick pay claims and a projection of its
effect on both future litigants and Satty on remand; (2) the "restora-
tion" of the "discriminatory effect" method of proving a Title VII
claim; (3) the reinstatement of at least part of the EEOC Guidelines
called into question in Gilbert; (4) the extent to which cost to the
employer may be considered by the Court in deciding whether a par-
ticular employer practice constitutes gender-based discrimination; and
(5) the effect of current and pending legislation on the Satty and Gil-
bert decisions and the possible effect of Satty on pending federal legis-
lation.
55. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined with Justice Powell, concurring in the
result. 98 S.Ct. at 354-57.
56. Id. at 353-54 n.6.
57. Cf. the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens, id. at 359 n.9. (agreeing with
the majority on this point).
58. 98 S. Ct. at 351. Section 703(a)(1) addresses discrimination with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. Section 703 (a) (2) makes
unlawful employment practices that "deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee because of . . . sex." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2).
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A. Exclusion of Pregnancy from Sick Leave Plans
In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, the company's refusal to allow Nora
Satty to use accumulated sick days to apply to her unpaid maternity
leave was held to be legally indistinguishable from the denial of dis-
ability pay in Gilbert and therefore not per se violative of Title VII.5 9
Whether this denial was nonetheless discriminatory was remanded. 0
For Nora Satty the crucial factor may prove to be the limited scope of
remand. As noted above,01 she must first prove that she adequately
raised in the lower courts the theory that her employer's sick leave
policy constituted a pretext for discrimination. Only then can the
court consider the merits of her claim.
Even if the lower court finds that Satty preserved her right to
proceed on the pretext theory, it is unlikely that she will recover the
withheld sick pay. Because she abandoned her attacks on other em-
ployment policies following adverse rulings in the district court, 62 to
succeed on the sick pay claim it is crucial that the lower court deem
her employer's seniority policy relevant in determining whether the
Nashville Gas Company's sick leave plan is a mere pretext for discrimi-
nation against women. 3 The Supreme Court found that the seniority
policy does violate Title VII, but the majority opinion, while acknowl-
edging that this policy "may" be relevant to pretext, emphatically as-
serted that the court on remand need not find it so.64 Indeed, in Gil-
bert -the Court found no pretext for discrimination, despite evidence
of a long history of General Electric policies that restricted women's
employment opportunities, 5 and despite the finding of the district
59. 98 S. Ct. at 352.
60. Id. at 353-54.
61. See text accompanying notes 37, 38 supra.
62. In addition to the claims argued on appeal, Satty had argued in district court
that she was discriminated against because: her employer's medical insurance paid re-
duced benefits for pregnancy as compared to hospitalizations for other causes; her em-
ployer failed to hold her job open while she was on leave; she was forced to begin
materity leave twenty-five days prior to the birth of her child; termination of her tem-
porary assignment was alleged to be in retaliation for her complaints about her em-
ployer's policies regarding pregnancy. 384 F. Supp. at 765.
63. This is so because the Court in Gilbert declined to "infer that the exclusion
of pregnancy disability benefits from petitioner's plan is a simple pretext for discrimi-
nating against women." 429 U.S. at 136.
64. 98 S. Ct. at 353.
65. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 149-50 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).




court that General Electric displayed a discriminatory attitude toward
women which acted as "a motivating factor in its policies."6 0
Even if Satty does not prevail on remand, other litigants attack-
ing sick leave policies may be more successful. 7 In addition to using
the pretext approach, future litigants should attempt to prove dis-
criminatory effect.6 The majority in Satty recognized the Griggs hold-
ing that a violation of section 703(a)(2) of Title VII can be estab-
lished by proof of discriminatory effect.60 Nevertheless, it found it
"difficult -to perceive" how exclusion of pregnancy from a sick leave
compensation program could violate that section. Instead, it main-
tained that section 703(a)(1) would "appear" to be the proper sec-
tion of Title VII under which to analyze such a claim.70 Since a dis-
criminatory effect had not been proven in Satty, it became unneces-
sary to decide whether such an effect would be sufficient to establish
a violation of section 703(a) (1). 71 Thus, despite the Court's intona-
tions to the contrary, future litigants may still be able to prevail on
section 703 (a) (1) claims without proof of discriminatory intent.
This possibility is likely to be tested in future complaints involv-
ing sick-pay plans. Where sick leave is accrued by length of employ-
ment and serves as a form of deferred compensation, it may be pos-
sible to show that a denial of earned sick pay for pregnancy, in con-
junction with mandatory leave, causes women to receive less total
compensation for their work than men.72 Under such a scheme, men
would be entitled to receive up to the specified number of paid sick
66. Id. at 150 (citing Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 383 (E.D.
Va. 1974)). But should the court of appeals find that the seniority policy is relevant
to this issue, the fact that it was a current practice at the time of the suit may dis-
tinguish it from the past discriminatory practices ignored by the Supreme Court in
Gilbert.
67. But see Women in City Gov't United v. City of New York, 563 F.2d 537 (2d
Cir. 1977); Guse v. J.C. Penney Co., 562 F.2d 6, 7 (7th Cir. 1977); EEOC v. Chil-
dren's Hosp., 556 F.2d 222, 223 (3d Cir. 1977); Liss v. School Dist., 548 F.2d 751
(8th Cir. 1977); Lewis v. Los Angeles City Unified School Dist., 429 F. Supp. 935
(C.D. Cal. 1977); Madrid v. Board of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 816 (N.D. Cal. 1977);
Tawney v. Board of Educ., 428 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. W. Va. 1977).
68. 98 S. Ct. at 353-54 n.6. Footnote 6 of the majority opinion implies that the
effect theory, while closed to Nora Satty, remains available for future cases,
69. Id. at 352 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
70.
[1]t is difficult to perceive how exclusion of pregnancy from a disability in-
surance plan or sick leave compensation program "deprives an individual of
employment opportunities" or "otherwise adversely affects his status as an em-
ployee" in violation of 703 (a) (2). The direct effect of the exclusion is merely a
loss of income for the period the employee is not at work; such an exclusion has
no direct effect upon either employment opportunities or job status.
Id. at 353.
71. Id.
72. See Justice Powell's suggestion that such a theory is plausible, even for Satty.
Id. at 355-56 (Powell, J., concurring).
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days for any sickness or disability suffered, while women would be
precluded from using any of -those sick days when actually disabled by
pregnancy. If it could be shown that the men covered by the plan gen-
erally used more sick days than the women, it could be argued that
pregnant women are denied access to sick leave, a component of their
salary, in an amount equal to the unused portion of -their sick time.
To the extent that the salary of the average male employed in the
same position includes payment for sick days in excess of the number
of sick days taken by the average female employee in that position,
the women would be receiving less total compensation for their work.73
In addition to establishing its disparate impact, one could show that
such a plan, if coupled with sex-stereotyping attitudes,7 4 is a pretext
for invidious economic discrimination against women.7 5
73. An amicus brief submitted in Berg characterized any denial of accrued sick
leave for pregnancy, without regard to a statistical analysis of the comparative number
of days generally used by men and women, as "a reduction of their salary." NEA Mo-
tion to File an Amicus Brief at 17, Richmond Unified School Dist. v. Berg, 528 F.2d
1208 (9th Cir. 1975). See also Comment, Income Protection for Pregnant Workers,
26 DRAiE L. REv. 389, 402 (1976-1977). But see Women in City Gov't, United v.
City of New York, 563 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1977):
An insurance plan is merely a form of compensation .... Discriminatory
effect or impact, in this context, is not measured by reference to a single form
of compensation, but could be proved only by showing a disparity in the total
value of all forms of compensation given to men and women. In determining
whether or not such a disparity existed, it would be necessary to compute the
value not only of health and disability insurance plans, but also of salary, life
insurance and retirement plans, fringe benefits such as transportation, day-care
services, physical fitness facilities, and the like. . . . Thus, if plaintiffs' views
were sound, it would require every employer subject to Title VII to determine
separately, with respect to race, color, religion, sex or national origin, the value
of each type of compensation he provides. Presumably, the disparities that
would inevitably be discovered would each have to be justified by a business
necessity. . . . To read Title VII so as to require such determinations and
justifications to be made by employers, and, concomitantly, by the district
courts, would be to impose upon the Act an administrative complexity un-
dreamed of by its draftsmen. Had the Supreme Court wanted the lower fed-
eral courts to embark on such a course, it would have been more explicit in
the General Electric opinion; indeed, the entire thrust of recent Title VII de-
cisions appears to point in the opposite direction.
563 F.2d at 540-41 (citations omitted).
74. The courts have consistently attacked sexual stereotyping. See, e.g., Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curium) (summary judgement for
defendant corporation improper when plaintiff charges denial of employment because of
policy not to accept applications from women with pre-school age children); Fortin v.
Darlington Little League, 514 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1975) (gender-based generalization
insufficient to justify exclusion of girls from Little League); Rosenfeld v. Southern
Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (employment policy denying opportunity
on the basis of a characterization of the physical capabilities and endurances of women
not excusable as a bona fide occupational qualification under Title VII); Diaz v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971)
(employer's refusal to hire males as flight attendants solely because of sex violates Title
VII).
75. This was the factual situation in Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528
F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 98 S. Ct. 623 (1977). Berg ad-
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Gilbert's incorporation of constitutional notions into a Title VII
case7 6 has led at least one litigant to argue a Title VII claim by mak-
ing use of due process attacks on conclusive presumptions. In Rich-
mond Unified School Dist. v. Berg,'7 the plaintiff argued in part that
a "conclusive presumption of a pregnant employee's non-disability for
purposes of denying accumulated sick leave, surely is as vulnerable to
the claim of a denial of due process as was the opposite presumption
in [Turner v. Department of Employment Security]." 78  Turner de-
clared a Utah statute making pregnant women ineligible for unem-
ployment benefits unconstitutional because of a conclusive presump-
tion of incapacity. In Berg the plaintiff contended -that a conclusive
presumption denying an employee liberty or property may signal not
only a due process violation, but also an infraction of Title VII where
the presumption is aimed at sex.79
Although the Court has not directly invalidated this approach, 0
it is unlikely to succeed. The Gilbert Court used constitutional analy-
sis narrowly for the sole purpose of defining sex discrimination in a
statutory case where the statute itself did not define sex discrimina-
tion.8' Attacking conclusive presumptions as a denial of due process
is a different and much broader use of constitutional analysis. The
Court may well find it an unwarranted extension of reliance on the
Constitution in a statutory claim.
vanced the argument that such a situation is distinguishable from Gilbert:
[the school district's] refusal to afford accumulated sick pay is part of an
overarching scheme of sex discrimination against pregnant schoolteachers,
founded upon invidiously discriminatory perspective upon the pregnant school-
teacher as one who must be forced to take leave because of a stereotype of
her condition of "temporary disability" . . . while being denied accumulated
sick pay when she actually does become disabled, during and after delivery or
otherwise ....
Brief for Respondent at 41, Richmond Unified School Dist. v. Berg, 528 F.2d 1208
(9th Cir. 1975). Moreover, Berg pointed to the sex stereotyping in the district's policy
of refusing sick pay for pregnant employees while at the same time offering one day
of paternity leave, without loss of pay, to fathers during or after their wives' confine-
ments. Berg characterized the policy as a stereotyped view of the father as the bread-
winner. Id. at 41-42.
76. Sex discrimination was defined by relying on Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974), an equal protection case. See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
77. 98 S. Ct. 623 (1977).
78. Brief for Respondent at 38, Richmond Unified School Dist. v. Berg, 528 F.2d
1208 (9th Cir. 1975) (emphasis in original) (citing Turner v. Department of Em-
ployment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (per curiam)).
79. Brief for Respondent at 39, Richmond Unified School Dist. v. Berg, 528 F.2d
1208 (9th Cir. 1975).
80. The Supreme Court remanded Berg without comment. 98 S. Ct. 623 (1977).




Berg was an action against a public employer, whereas both Satty
and Gilbert sued private sector employers. It might be thought that
in a suit against a state agency, the fourteenth amendment would pro-
vide a basis for employing due process analysis. The Court's remand
of Berg for further consideration in light of Gilbert and Satty8 2 may
indicate that Title VII has a broader sweep than the constitutional
arguments, making the latter unavailing to a plaintiff who is unsuc-
cessful in establishing a violation of the statute.
The distinction drawn in Satty between disability benefits and
burdens may not prove elucidating with respect to sick pay. One can
view sick pay as a benefit extended to both men and women for ordi-
nary illness but not extended to the unique condition of pregnancy. 3
On the other hand, denial of sick pay for pregnancy can be seen as a
burden imposed on women by denying them access to a form of de-
ferred compensation earned through their own past efforts. Such a
burden is never imposed on men; nor is it imposed on non-pregnant
women, although Justice Stevens' comment that "it is the capacity of
women to become pregnant which primarily differentiates -the female
from the male"8 4 indicates that all women are potentially burdened
by this policy.8 5 Thus, a plaintiff might argue that the exclusion of
pregnant women from sick pay benefits disadvantages a large class of
female employees on the basis of a condition unique to their sex, in
violation of the policy of Title VII to insure equal treatment for all
women.8 6
82. 98 S. Ct. 623 (1977).
83. The district court in Gilbert specifically found that pregnancy was (1) often
voluntary and (2) per se not a disease. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367,
377 (E.D. Va. 1974), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The Supreme Court found this
critical. Id. at 136. Note that the district court also found that a pregnancy without
complications is normally disabling for six to eight weeks following birth; 10% of preg-
nancies terminate in disabling miscarriages; 5% of pregnancies are complicated by dis-
eases stimulated by pregnancy and such complications may lead to disability. Id. at 377.
84. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 162 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. Approximately "80 percent of all women become pregnant at some point in
their worklives." Hearings on S. 995 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate
Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 113,130 (1977) (statement of
Wendy W. Williams) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. It is notable that the capacity
of women to become pregnant is the justification most often advanced for employment
policies disadvantaging women. Id. at 123. Moreover, on the basis of capacity, the dis-
trict court in Gilbert held that a class action could be maintained not just by GE em-
ployees who had been or were pregnant at the time of the suit, but by all women em-
ployees. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 59 F.R.D. 267, 272-73 (E.D. Va. 1973). See also
Recent Developments, 45 FORDHAm L. Ruv. 1202, 1221 (1977).
86. NEA Motion to File an Amicus Brief at 18, Richmond Unified School Dist.
v. Berg, 528 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975). Since Berg was remanded for further consid-
eration in light of Gilbert and Satty, this argument appears to have been unavailing.
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The argument is unlikely to succeed, however, without concomi-
tant proof of pretext or effect. In Gilbert, the Court did not find de-
nial of disability insurance coverage for pregnancy per se violative of
Title VII, and in Satty it found Gilbert dispositive of denial of sick
pay to pregnant employees absent proof of pretext or effect. In Berg,
the companion case to Satty, the Court appeared to impart no signifi-
cance to a distinction between sick leave and disability insurance.8 7
The plaintiffs in Berg characterized the former as an element of sal-
ary, payable even if the employee is temporarily absent due to illness
or disability, so long as the absences do not exceed the specified num-
ber of days per year.88 Insurance, on the other hand, they viewed as
paying a benefit each time an employee incurred a covered illness or
disability, regardless of whether a payment had been made within that
year for other illnesses or disabilities suffered by that employee.80 The
Court remanded the case without elaboration.
B,. Restoration of Effect Analysis
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Satty case is its restora-
tion of discriminatory effect analysis. The Supreme Court's opinion in
Gilbert had led Justice Blackmun,90 the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals,91 and at least one commentator92 to wonder whether the effect
analysis employed in Griggs for proving a Title VII claim had been
rendered invalid.
Although the Court in Gilbert had acknowledged that a prima
facie violation of Title VII can sometimes be established by proof of
87. Satty argued no such distinction. She conceded in her brief that the sick leave
plan offered by her employer is "for all intents and purposes, the same as the plan
examined in Gilbert." Brief for Respondent at 8, Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 522 F.2d
850 (6th Cir. 1975).
88. NEA Motion to file an Amicus Brief at 16, Richmond Unified School Dist. v.
Berg, 528 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975).
89. Id. Although not addressed in the brief, the distinction would not hold where
disability pay is given only for a limited number of days per year or per illness.
90. "I do not join any inference or suggestion in the Court's opinion-if any such
inference or suggestion is there-that effect may never be a controlling factor in a Title
VII case, or that Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), is no longer good
law. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 146 (Blackmun, J., concurring). But
see Id. at 146, (Stewart, J., concurring).
91. The Second Circuit has recently held that Gilbert bars plaintiffs from estab-
lishing discrimination through proof of disparate impact. Women in City Gov't United
v. City of New York, 563 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir. 1977). But see Love v. Waukesha
Joint School Dist. No. 1, 560 F.2d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1977).
92. See Recent Developments, supra note 85, at 1216-17 which suggests that the
validity of Griggs was called into question by the Court's citation of McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 416 U.S. 792 (1973) as contrary authority.
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the discriminatory effect of an otherwise facially neutral plan, it had
maintained that the respondents in that case had not attempted to
demonstrate this effect,93 and stated:
As there is no proof that the package is in fact worth more to men
than to women, it is impossible to find any gender-based discrimina-
tory effect in this scheme simply because women disabled as a result
of pregnancy do not receive benefits; that is to say, gender-based
discrimination does not result simply because an employer's disabil-
ity-benefits plan is less than all inclusive. For all that appears, preg-
nancy-related disabilities constitute an additional risk, unique to
women, and the failure to compensate them for this risk does not
destroy the presumed parity of the benefits, accruing to men and
women alike, which results from the facially evenhanded inclusion
of risks.94
Thus, although the effect analysis was still a possible approach, con-
siderable doubts had been raised. Given the presumption of parity re-
garding benefits even when pregnancy is excluded, it seemed virtually
impossible for a plaintiff to prove discriminatory effect.9
Shortly after Gilbert, the Supreme Court decided International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,96 a Title VII case involv-
ing racial discrimination. In that decision it carefully distinguished
the disparate treatment theory of recovery from claims of disparate im-
pact under a facially neutral plan.97 In the former, discriminatory mo-
tive is critical; in the latter, motive is immaterial and the test is
whether the practice is justified by business necessity. Recovery was
granted under the disparate impact theory,98 thus establishing it as a
viable method of recovery for section 703(a) violations involving ra-
cial discrimination. Whether the technique was available in claims of
sex discrimination remained open.
In its treatment of the senority issue in Satty, the Court employed
a discriminatory effect analysis,9 9 thus dispelling any fears that such an
93. 429 U.S. at 137.
94. Id. at 138-40 (emphasis in original).
95. That such a burden rests on the plaintiff is clear. See Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973). See also General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 137 n.14.
96. 97 S. Ct. 1843 (1977).
97. Id. at 1854-55 n.15.
98. Id. at 1854-58.
99.
We have recognized, however, that both intentional discrimination and
policies neutral on their face but having a discriminatory effect may run afoul
of § 703(a) (2). Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 431 (1971). It is be-
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analysis would be unavailing where pregnancy is an issue. This is im-
portant because this analysis has often proved useful, especially in
cases of less overt discrimination where the employee is usually un-
able to show the employer's intent. 100 In such cases, statistical analyses,
while not irrefutable,' 0 ' are considered competent as evidence of em-
ployment discrimination. Pervasive statistical disparity in the treat-
ment of classes of workers-for example, by race or sex-constitutes a
prima facie violation of Title VII and places on the defendant ,the bur-
den of proving that the disparity, if admitted, serves legitimate busi-
ness needs. 02
Title VII cases that have successfully employed the effect analy-
sis have generally involved racial discrimination by employers and
unions. 0 3 Satty extends the use of this analysis at least to some sec-
tion 703(a)(2) claims of discrimination involving pregnancy. In ad-
dition to seniority, rights such as accrued retirement benefits and free-
dom from involuntary transfers extending beyond the duration of the
pregnancy may now be protected by the effect technique. 04 In matters
of sick leave and disability benefits, however, the method may remain
less useful. Unless the Court tests equality of benefits by examining
exclusions from coverage as well as inclusions,105 or adopts Justice
yond dispute that petitioner's policy of depriving employees returning from
pregnancy leave of their accumulated seniority acts both to deprive them "of
employment opportunities" and to "adversely affect [their] status as an em-
ployee."
98 S. Ct. at 350-51.
100. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 154-55 n.7 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (listing eleven court of appeals cases that used discriminatory effect to make
out a prima facie violation of Title VII); See Recent Developments, supra note 85,
at 1218-19.
101. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1856-
57.
102. NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 910 (1975); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 368 (8th Cir.
1973); United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 414
n.1l (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 929 (1973); United States v. Chesapeake & 0.
Ry., 471 F.2d 582, 586 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973); United
States v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners Local 169, 457 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112,
120 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 550-51 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
103. See cases cited in note 102 supra.
104. See, e.g., Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 437 F. Supp. 413 (1977)
(airline policy requiring pregnant flight attendants to liquidate their accrued vacation
benefits, thereby depriving them of life and health insurance, travel benefits, and ac-
crual of additional seniority during that period, violates Title VII).
105. See text accompanying note 94 supra. For criticism of the Court's approach,
see Comment, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert: A Lesson in Sex Education and Dis-
crimination-The Relationship Between Pregnancy and Gender and the Vitality of the
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Powell's position that denial of sick pay during a mandatory mater-
nity leave might result in less total compensation for women, 106 re-
covery for sick pay claims will be more likely where plaintiffs have




As noted above, 07 the Court in Gilbert declined to rely on a por-
tion of the 1972 EEOC Guideline which instructed that "payment
under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan,
formal or informal, shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or
childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to
other temporary disabilities."'108 But in a footnote in Satty the same
Court gave credence to a different portion of the same guideline in its
consideration of seniority. 0 9 The Court quoted, with apparent ap-
proval, the following portion: "'written and unwritten employment
policies and practices involving . . . the accrual of seniority . . . and
reinstatement ... shall be applied to pregnancy and childbirth on the
same terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary dis-
abilities.' "110 The full text of section 1604.10(b) of the guideline,
from which the Court quoted, is as follows:
Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage,
abortion, childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related
purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as such under
any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan avail-
able in connection with employment. Written and unwritten employ-
ment policies and practices involving matters such as the commence-
ment and duration of leave, the availability of extensions, the ac-
crual of seniority, and other benefits and privileges, reinstatement,
Disproportionate Impact Analysis, 1977 UTAH L. Rv. 111, 131-33; Comment, 6
U. BALT. L. Rnv. 313, 328 (1977).
106. 98 S. Ct. at 355-56 (Powel, J., concurring).
107. See text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
108. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1976). In rejecting the agency's guidelines, the
Gilbert Court applied the rationale of Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 462 F.2d 1331 (5th
Cir. 1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 86 (1973), where an EEOC guideline was found invalid as
inconsistent with a Congressionally approved policy. Espinoza concluded that the court
need not defer to an administrative construction of a statute where there are "com-
pelling indications that it is wrong." 414 U.S. at 94-95. In view of the similarity of
interpretations issued by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare under Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and by the Office of Federal Contract Com-
pliance under Executive Order 11478, the application is questionable.
109. 98 S. Ct. at 351 n.4.
110. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b)).
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and payment under any health or temporary disability insurance or
sick leave plan formal or informal, shall be applied to disability due
to pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they
are applied to other temporary disabilities."'
The Court attempted to explain its editing:
In Gilbert . . . we rejected another portion of this same guideline
because it conflicted with prior, and thus more contemporaneous, in-
terpretations of the EEOC, with interpretations of other federal
agencies charged with executing legislation dealing with sex discrimi-
nation, and with the applicable legislative history of Title VII. We
did not, however, set completely at nought the weight to be given
the 1972 guideline ...
The portion of the 1972 Guideline which prohibits the practice
under attack here is fully consistent with past interpretations of Title
VII by the EEOC.... Nor have we been pointed to any conflict-
ing opinions of other federal agencies responsible for regulating in
the field of sex discrimination. This portion of the 1972 Guideline
is therefore entitled to more weight than was the one considered in
Gilbert. Skidmore v. Swift & Co." 2
The Court apparently rejected the first sentence of section 1604.10(b)
and assigned different weight to various parts of the second. Specifi-
cally, it gave -the portions regarding seniority and reinstatement more
weight than the portion relating to disability payments. The precise
degree of deference to be accorded this portion, however, was not
made clear.
Furthermore, the Court's reference to Skidmore v. Swift & Co.118
is somewhat puzzling. Skidmore set forth four criteria for determin-
ing the weight of an agency's interpretation of a statute: thoroughness,
validity of reasoning, consistency with earlier and later pronounce-
ments, and persuasiveness." 4 The Court in Satty, however, apparently
found consistency most important, if not controlling. 15 It was the con-
flict between the EEOC's earliest pronouncement, contained in an
opinion letter written in 1966,116 and the more recent guidelines
111. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b).
112. 98 S. Ct. at 351 n.4 (citations omitted).
113. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
114. Id. at 140.
115. In both Salty and Gilbert the Court focused on this factor without men-
tioning the other three Skidmore criteria. While consistency may have some bearing on
the other three factors, it by no means determines them.
116. An opinion letter by the General Counsel of the EEOC dated October 17,
1966, concluded that a longterm salary continuation plan which excluded pregnancy
and childbirth would not be in violation of Title VII in accord with the Commission's
[Vol. 27
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
which was fatal to the disability insurance portion of the 1972 guide-
lines.
Given the context in which the EEOC's 1966 opinion letter had
been written, the importance accorded it by the Court in Gilbert was
undeserved. When the EEOC was created, it faced the task of inter-
preting the scope of the sex discrimination prohibition with no legis-
lative guidance. It initially issued tentative interpretations, and, in its
statement in the First Annual Report to Congress in 1966, admitted
the difficulty of formulating standards for the treatment of pregnant
employees:
The prohibition against sex discrimination is especially difficult to
apply with respect to the female employee who becomes pregnant.
In all other questions involving sex discrimination, the underlying
principle is the essential equality of treatment for male and female
employees. The pregnant female, however, has no analogous coun-
terpart and pregnancy must necessarily be treated uniquely.117
It is thus clear that the agency had not formulated a consistent ap-
proach to pregnancy at that time.
The revised guidelines, promulgated just after the EEOC was
given expanded powers under the 1972 Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act,118 represent the most considered thinking of the agency on
the subject. The Gilbert Court stated that there was "no suggestion
that some new source of legislative history had been discovered in the
intervening eight years" to justify the difference in the agency's posi-
tion, but it failed to recognize the apparent Congressional desire to
give the EEOC greater power to control employment discrimination. 19
In assessing an administrative interpretation, the Court in Skidmore
weighed the "thoroughness evident in its consideration, and the valid-
ity of its reasoning."' 20 In Gilbert and Satty, however, such factors
were largely ignored.121
earlier statement that "maternity is a temporary disability unique to the female sex and
more or less to be anticipated during the working life of most women employees" and,
therefore, is not to be compared with illness or injury. EmPL. PRAc. GumE (CCH)
1 17, 304.43 (1970).
117. 1 REOC ANN. REP. 40, 41 (1965).
118. Public Law 92-261, adopted on Mar. 24, 1972, gave the Commission author-
ity to file suits against private employers, employment agencies and unions when con-
ciliation efforts failed, expanded its jurisdiction to private and public educational in-
stitutions and state and local governments, and provided that, after March, 1973, cov-
erage would be broadened to included employers or unions with fifteen or more em-
ployees.
119. 429 U.S. at 145.
120. 323 U.S. at 140.
121. Only in Justice Brennan's dissent in Gilbert did the Court recognize that the
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The 1972 Guidelines had been attacked 22 for having been issued
without scientific study as -to probable impact,123 and for the lack of
public hearings or debate before their adoption.124 By approving the
seniority aspect of the guideline in Satty without addressing these de-
ficiencies, it would appear that the Court has implied that these de-
ficiencies are not fatal. Thus, the remainder of the EEOC Guidelines
promulgated in 1972, while not applicable to Gilbert or Satty, would
seem to stand unless found inconsistent with prior interpretations by
the EEOC or other relevant agencies. 125 This is particularly important
with regard to section 1604.10(a), which considers exclusion from em-
ployment because of pregnancy a prima facie violation of Title VII,120
and section 1604.10(c), which allows proof of a violation by disparate
impact where, absent business necessity, termination of a temporarily
disabled employee is caused by a policy in which leave is insufficient
or unavailable.'27
1972 interpretation "followed thorough and well-informed consideration," 429 U.S. at
157, and therefore may comply with the Skidmore criteria. Mr. Justice Brennan fur-
ther explained: "Indeed, realistically viewed, this extended evaluation of an admittedly
ccnnplex problem and an unwillingness to impose additional, potentially premature costs
on. employers during the decisioninaking stages ought to be perceived as a practice to
be commended. It is bitter irony that the care that preceded promulgation of the 1972
guideline is today condemned by the Court as tardy indecisiveness, its unwillingness ir-
responsibly to challenge employers' practices during the formative period is labeled as
evidence of inconsistency, and this indecisiveness and inconsistency are bootstrapped into
reasons for denying the Commission's interpretation its due deference." Id.
122. Prior to Gilbert, most of these attacks failed in the lower courts. Satty v.
Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School
Dist., 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1037 (1977); Gilbert v.
General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975); Communication Workers v. AT&T,
513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977); Wetzel
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on jurisdic-
tional grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976). But see Newnion v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 374
F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
123. See generally Comment, Waiting for the Other Shoe-Wetzel and Gilbert in
the Supreme Court, 25 EmoRY L.J. 125, 129, 131-32 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Com-
ment, Waiting for the Other Shoe]; Comment, Current Trends in Pregnancy Benefits
-1972 EEOC Guidelines Interpreted, 24 DEPAUL L. REv. 127, 131, 134 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as Comment, Current Trends].
124. This was not technically required. See generally Comment, Waiting for the
Other Shoe, supra note 123, at 132-34; Comment, Current Trends, supra note 123, at
131.
125. Lack of contemporaneity is not specifically enumerated in Skidmore, but the
Court listed it as a defect in Gilbert and began its analysis with it. Since that portion
of the guideline accepted in Satty is also not contemporaneous with Title VII, the de-
feet is apparently not fatal when no inconsistency with prior or later positions exists.
126. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a).
127. Id. § 1604.10(c).
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D. Cost of Pregnancy Benefits
The economic impact of extending benefits to or withholding
them from pregnant employees must be examined from two perspec-
tives: the cost to women in lost wages and benefits while on maternity
leave,128 and the cost incurred by employers in extending benefits for
pregnancy. Although the former costs have never been elucidated by
the Court, they may, in fact, be substantial. Approximately eighty
percent of all women become pregnant during their worklives,129 and
seventy percent of working women are employed because they must
support their families either because they are the sole earner or be-
cause their husband's income is less than $7,000 per year. 30 Moreover,
the impact of lost income may be greater on families headed by fe-
males, since their median income is approximately half that of fami-
lies headed by men.13 '
Because no violation of Title VII was found in Gilbert or for the
sick pay claim in Satty, it was unnecessary to consider cost to the em-
ployer as a possible business necessity defense. 3 2 Nonetheless, the Gil-
bert Court noted that the average cost to the company of General
Electric's current disability plan, excluding pregnancy, had been
higher for women than men in both 1970 and 1971; the cost for fe-
males was estimated to be 170% of the cost for males at the time of
trial.133
In Geduldig v. Aiello,134 the Court specifically expressed concern
for the cost of a pregnancy benefits plan to an employer, and recog-
nized that California's interest in maintaining both the self-support-
ing nature of its insurance plan and a non-burdensome contribution
128. Under a disability insurance plan such as GE's, the cost would include loss
of payments for any disability, even if unrelated to pregnancy, incurred while on ma-
ternity leave. Such was the plight of Emma Furch, a plaintiff in Gilbert.
129. See note 85 supra.
130. U.S. Dep't of Labor, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS AD., WOMEN'S BUREAU, WHY
WOMEN WORK (rev. ed. 1974). See also Hearings, supra note 85, at 26 (statement of
Sen. Edward Kennedy). For a discussion of the economic problems faced by working
women when they become pregnant, see Hearings, supra note 85, at 197 (statement of
N.Y. State Sen. Carol Bellamy); Comment, Waiting for the Other Shoe, supra note 123,
at 152.
131. In 1972 families headed by women had a median income of $5380 per year
compared to $10,350 for families headed by men. Hayghe, Marital and Family Char-
acteristics of the Labor Force in March 1973, 97 MONTHLY LABOR REv. 21, 25 (April
1974).
132. Cost is relevant to, but alone not determinative of, business necessity. Robin-
son v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 n.8 (4th Cir. 1971).
133. 429 U.S. at 130-31.
134. 417 U.S. at 493-96.
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rate was legitimate.135 Thus, it is possible that cost was an underlying
reason for the Court's analysis in Gilbert.86 The first part of the Satty
decision is consistent with this possibility, since in maintaining ac-
crued seniority benefits for women on maternity leave an employer
would incur no significant cost. Whether there would be a substantial
cost to an employer who allowed pregnant employees to utilize their
accrued sick leave depends on the particular type of sick leave plan
and to what extent the employees currently use their benefits under
it. If sick leave is allowed to accumulate from year to year, there is no
cost to the employer in allowing it to be used for pregnancy. In fact,
it may be cheaper for the employer to permit the allotted sick days to
be taken during pregnancy than to have -them used in later years when
the employee's rate of pay is likely to be higher. If the sick leave plan
is non-cumulative, but women of child-bearing age generally use all
their sick days, there would again be no cost to the employer. Em-
ployees who use up their accrued sick leave for pregnancy-related dis-
abilities would not have those days available for other illnesses. If,
however, the sick leave plan is non-cumulative-that is, any days not
used within the year are lost-and those employees capable of becom-
ing pregnant generally do not use up all of their sick leave time, there
could be a significant cost -to the employer who permits utilization of
sick days for pregnancy. 137
By refusing to require employers to assume the cost for disability
payments and sick leave for pregnant workers, the Court has forced
families to bear that cost. Ironically, families that cannot sustain this
burden must resort to public and private welfare organizations. In
135. Id. at 496.
136. See Comment, Current Trends, supra note 123, at 140-41 for the theory that
analysis of cost in recent equal protection cases, in addition to the Title VII business
necessity defense, may indicate that the Court considers cost of providing benefits a
relevant factor in excusing discrimination.
137. For the theory that even these costs may not be as high as originally thought,
see Kistler & McDonough, Paid Maternity Leave-Benefits May justify the Cost, 26
LABOR L.J. 782, 786, 794 (Dec. 1975). the authors suggest that lower turnover rates
and increased morale, which are likely to result from providing disability pay for preg-
nancy, may offset the costs of the policy. The article also contains a chart of insurance
company disability plans and the additional cost of coverage for disabilities due to preg-
nancy. Id. at 792. The factors for determining the cost of any particular plan are: (1)
anticipated number of pregnancies (based on the number and ages of female employ-
ees), (2) average duration of disability, (3) amount of salary paid during leave, and
(4) expense of administering the plan. Id. at 793. See also Hearings, supra note 85,
at 430, 447-49, 485-86, 568-74 for estimating costs of implementing S. 995 (discussed
at text accompanying notes 146-50 infra) and for costs to various companies and states




effect, the Court in Satty has decided that absent Congressional action,
this is the most appropriate resolution. The Court seems to reflect the
deep-seated aversion of many employers to what they view as a subsidy
to families for a voluntarily assumed or planned condition. 138 If this is
so, the Court has ignored the fact that many of the same companies
already cover, and hence "subsidize," voluntary cosmetic surgery and
non-work-related illnesses and injuries from smoking, sports, and other
risky activities voluntarily undertaken.139
Of course, not all pregnancies are planned,140 and in light of the
Court's decision that the Constitution does not compel states to pro-
vide Medicaid coverage for elective abortions,' 41 it is possible that not
all pregnancies are voluntarily undertaken. Whether or not planned,
pregnancy can in fact be disabling. While some incapacitation may be
expected in a normal pregnancy, 142 complications are generally un-
foreseeable and certainly unplanned. Even when a company seeks to
withhold coverage for time lost for a planned birth, complications
should logically be covered. Where company policy is to cover all ac-
tual disabilities, however, whether or not a risk was voluntarily un-
dertaken should be immaterial, and all disabilities, whether expected
or unforeseen, should be covered for all pregnancies.
A further consideration in Gilbert and Satty may have been the
fear that many pregnant women will not return -to work following ma-
ternity leave and thus will receive an unjustified form of severance
pay. Whatever merit this argument may have regarding disability in-
surance, it cannot reasonably apply to sick pay, which should be viewed
not as a purely gratuitous benefit, but as an element of salary. 48 Sick
pay is merely a form of compensation for past services. Moreover, the
notion that women are less likely to return to work than an otherwise
disabled employee may be based largely on a social stereotype which
is no longer accurate. 44 In fact, by allowing use of sick days for dis-
abilities or providing insurance coverage for time lost due to preg-
138. See Kistler & McDonough, supra note 137, at 786-87; Note, Income Pro-
tection for Pregnant Workers, 26 DRAKE L. REv. 389, 394 (1976-1977); Comment,
Waiting for the Other Shoe, supra note 123, at 158-59.
139. See, e.g., the disability plan provided by GE, which is set forth in part in
Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 374. See also Arguments Before the
Court, supra note 52, at 3232.
140. Nora Satty's pregnancy was unplanned. Brief for Respondent, supra note 52,
at 3.
141. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
142. See note 83 supra.
143. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
144. See note 130 & accompanying text supra.
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nancy, an employer may provide an incentive for the worker to re-
main with the company. Finally, there are indications that rate of
turnover may be related more to the kind of job held, its status and
skill level, the age of the employee and length of tenure than to the
decision of women to remain home with an infant.
145
E. Proposed Legislation
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Gilbert, Senator
Harrison Williams introduced a bill to amend Title VII to clarify that
prohibitions against sex discrimination in the Act include discrimina-
tion in employment on the basis of pregnancy or pregnancy related
disabilities.'46 The bill was passed by the Senate on September 16,
1977. Its companion bill in the House, 147 which was reported out of
Committee in amended form,14 awaits a vote by the House member-
ship. Moreover, twenty-two states, including New York, already re-
quire coverage of pregnancy in employee disability benefits pro-
grams.1 49
145. See Grossman, The Labor Force Patterns of Divorced and Separated Women,
100 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 48, 49-51 (Jan. 1977); Johnson & Hayghe, Labor Force
Participation of Married Women, March 1976, 100 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 32 (March
1977).
146. S. 995 proposes to add § 701(k) to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e:
(k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or re-
lated medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and
nothing in section 703 (h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.
S. 995, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977).
147. H.R. 6075, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977).
148. The House version now adds:
As used in this subsection, neither "pregnancy" nor "related medical con-
ditions," as they relate to eligibility for benefits under any health or tempo-
rary disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with em-
ployment, may be construed to include abortions, except where the life of the
mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term: Provided, that
nothing herein shall preclude an employer from providing abortion benefits or
otherwise affect bargaining agreements in regard to abortion.
H.R. REP. No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
149. 1974 Alaska Sess. Laws § 39.20.260(e); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420.2 (West
Cum. Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-126 (West Supp. 1978); HAw. Rv.
STAT. § 392-21 (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978);
IND. CODE ANN. § 22.9-1-1 (Bums Supp. 1977) (as interpreted by a state enforcement
agency); KAN. STAT. § 44-1009 (Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 19A (Michie
Supp. 1977); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 150D (West Supp. 1977-1978) ; Miou.
Co mp. LAws ANN. § 750.556 (West Supp. 1977-1978) (as interpreted in [1967] OP.
ATT'Y GEN. No. 4168, at 150; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01 (West Supp. 1978); Mo.
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Since -the Senate bill is a legislative response to Gilbert, the
Court's assertion that the sick pay issue in Satty is controlled by Gil-
bert may give further impetus to the passage of its House counterpart;
to the extent that Satty limits Gilbert to situations denying additional
benefits rather than imposing long-term burdens, a small portion of
the hardships encountered by pregnant employees and their depend-
ents has been removed, making the bill less necessary in a narrow area.
Should it be passed, the pending legislation will require any employer
who chooses to offer disability coverage or sick pay to include benefits
or paid sick days for actual disability related to pregnancy. 150 Simi-
larly, the current state laws cited above impose such a duty and effec-
tively negate Gilbert where they are operative.
CONCLUSION
Since 1974, when Geduldig v. Aiello held that disparate treat-
ment of pregnancy does not constitute gender-based discrimination,
pregnant women have been unable to look to equal protection analy-
sis when denied disability benefits. In 1976, by applying Geduldig's
definition of sex discrimination to the Title VII claim in General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the Supreme Court denied pregnant women
statutory relief when disability benefits had been withheld. The
Court's decision in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty holds that denial of
paid sick leave for pregnancy must be considered under a Gilbert
analysis. Thus, unless pretext or disparate effect can be shown, the
only recourse in these areas may be legislation or inclusion of the
benefits in collective bargaining agreements.
ANN. STAT. § 296.020 (Vernon Supp. 1978) (as interpreted by a state enforcement
agency); N.J. STAT ANN. § 43: 21-29 (West 1962); N.Y. EXEC. § 296 (McKinney
Supp. 1977) (as interpreted in Union Free School Dist. No. 6 v. New York Human
Rights Appeal Bd., 35 N.Y.2d 371, 320 N.E.2d 859, 362 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1974); Board
of Educ. v. New York Div. of Human Rights, 35 N.Y. 673, 319 N.E.2d 202, 360
N.Y.S.2d 887, (1974)); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.029 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 954 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978) (as interpreted in Freeport Area School Dist. v. Penn-
sylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 400, 335 A.2d 873 (1975));
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-41-8 (1956); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-10 (Supp.
1977); WASa. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010 (Supp. 1977) (as interpreted by state
enforcement agency); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.31 (West Supp. 1977-1978) (as inter-
preted in Ray-O-Vac Div. of E.S.B., Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Hu-
man Relations, 70 Wis. 2d 919, 236 N.W. 2d 209 (1975).
150. In addition, many companies voluntarily include pregnancy in disability bene-
fits. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 85, at 60-62, 249-53, for a partial list of those firms.
It is estimated that 60% of the disability plans in this country voluntarily cover preg-
nancy. Id. at 11 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
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In its treatment of seniority benefits, however, Satty represents
progress for pregnant women. Under Satty an employment practice
,that burdens a woman beyond the duration of her pregnancy may be
found violative of Title VII unless justified by business necessity.
Thus, Gilbert has been limited in an important way. Moreover,
Satty's restoration of the discriminatory effect technique for proving
a Title VII claim and its reinstatement of part of the 1972 EEOC
Guidelines should facilitate recovery in future Title VII litigation.
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